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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the link between board independence and the quality of community 
disclosures in annual reports. Using content analysis and a panel dataset from UK FTSE 350 
companies the results indicate a statistically significant relationship between board 
independence, as measured by the proportion of nonexecutive directors, and the quality of 
community disclosures, while holding constant other corporate governance and firm specific 
variables. The study indicates that companies with more non-executive directors are likely to 
disclose higher quality information on their community activities than others. This finding 
offers important insights to policy makers who are interested in achieving optimal board 
composition and furthers our understanding of the firm’s interaction with its corporate and 
extended environment through high-quality disclosures. The originality of this paper lies in the 
fact that it is the first to specifically examine the relationship between outside directors and 
community disclosures in annual reports. The paper contributes both to the corporate 
governance and community disclosure literature. 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the impact of board composition on corporate community involvement 
disclosure (CCID) for a sample of UK listed companies. The composition of the board of directors in a 
company is crucial in providing strategic direction (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Gul and Leung, 2004). It is 
therefore not surprising that there have been significant increases in regulation and corporate 
governance (CG) reforms focusing on board composition following various corporate scandals in the 
past decades.  
Boards of profit-orientated companies are usually composed of individuals that bring 
considerable expertise, experience and skills, each one within their own specialist field, such as 
financial experts, lawyers, marketing specialists, top management of other firms and community 
leaders (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Mitchell et al., 1997). Similarly, based on the taxonomy of 
directors proposed by Hillman et al. (2000), some corporate boards also compose of community 
leaders. This type  of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) are important to the corporation because they 
can provide immense information and experience on the impact of organisational activities on the 
society at large and its relationships with powerful community groups. To this extent, it can be argued 
that the presence of community leaders on corporate boards can contribute enormously to corporate 
legitimacy [1] by facilitating the acceptance of the company’s operations by its external environment, 
i.e. the community, ensuring necessary corporate survival and success (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003).  
Furthermore, evidence on the growing importance of community leaders in the board’s strategic 
decision making has started to emerge [2]. For example, in a study of the impact of environmental 
changes on board composition, Hillman et al. (2000) show that during shifts from a regulated to a 
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deregulated environment, where business uncertainty increases, firms tend to increase the number of 
community influential figures on their boards. As the authors suggest (Hillman et al., 2000, p.252), 
“Environmental jolts such as deregulation change the nature of the interdependencies and resource 
needs faced by the firm, thus altering the needs with respect to the extra-governance roles of directors”.  
This strategic move of including community influential figures on the board stems from firms’ 
increasing need to adjust promptly to an uncertain business environment by allowing non-business 
perspectives and ideas to be heard; as well as, utilising the directors’ influence on various community 
groups  (Hillman et al., 2000). These results, on the influence and growing importance of community 
representatives on the board, are further corroborated by Hillman and Keim (2001) who show a 
statistically significant positive relationship between the number of community directors and firm’s 
performance on aspects of diversity [3].  
One of the areas in which community leaders on the board could influence corporate actions is 
Corporate Community Involvement Disclosure (CCID) [4].  CCID is the disclosure, in annual reports, of 
the involvement of corporations in social initiatives in the communities in which they operate (Moon 
and Muthuri, 2006). Marquis et al. (2007, p.926) [5], refer to the same idea as corporate social action, 
describing it as  “behaviors and practices that extend beyond immediate profit maximization goals and 
are intended to increase social benefits or mitigate social problems for constituencies external to the 
firm”. Similarly, Moon and Muthuri (2006) argue that Corporate Community Involvement (CCI) goes 
beyond donations to charities to include committing significant time and other company’s resources 
such as money, skills and expertise to community projects and developments, including but not limited 
to arts, housing, the environment, poverty eradication, health and wellbeing, welfare and general 
improvements in the quality of life of the community. These CCI activities are undertaken not as a 
responsibility but as recognition of a deserving action by the corporation to its community of 
operations (Marquis et al., 2007).  
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The importance of CCI can be traced to the mid-20th century following the end of the war.  
Tallon (2010) argues that CCI was one of the strategies adopted for economic and social regeneration 
by the UK, US and other governments between the late 1940s and early 1960s due to the devastating 
effects of the World War II, such as poverty, unemployment and homelessness (Bush et al., 2008). 
Businesses were therefore encouraged to get involved in community development with the intention of 
increasing the rate of industrial and economic growth (Moon and Muthuri, 2006). Consequently, 
corporations moved from philanthropic activities prior to World War II, to actual involvement in 
community development and social rebuilding after the war through corporate social actions (Bush et 
al., 2008). In this sense, Matten and Crane’s (2005) expositions on the pervading roles of corporations 
in discharging state-like responsibilities such as protecting, enabling and implementing citizenship 
right, and Scherer and Palazzo’s (2011) arguments on the growing political role of firms are indicative 
of the importance of CCI and the significant roles of firms in the life of their community of operations.  
             Prior studies have suggested that social disclosure is positively related with increased social 
concern by the firm (Cho and Patten, 2007; Patten, 2002). Evidently, one of the most important tools 
for providing corporate legitimacy is the use of corporate disclosure and especially social reporting 
(Cho and Patten, 2007; Parker, 2011). Consequently, we argue that, pragmatically, firms need to 
constantly renew their legitimacy with their community of operation and this is achieved through 
effective communication (e.g. through corporate disclosure). Distrust could arise between a firm and its 
important stakeholders due to poor communication (Suchman, 1995) that could be counterproductive to 
the achievement of corporate goals (Bebbington et al., 2008; Mitchell et al., 1997). This is because, 
according to Clarkson (1995), the community is viewed as an important member of the stakeholder 
system that can disrupt the corporation’s operations (for example, through sabotage or lack of 
patronage) if their expectations are not met.  
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         Moreover, Bebbington et al. (2008) stress that neglecting the expectations of the community can 
constitute reputation risk to the firm. Suchman (1995) also argues that companies have to continuously 
maintain their societal legitimacy and mitigate the threats to it. Stressing the importance of frequent 
interaction between the company and its conferring public, Suchman (1995, p.596) notes that “frequent 
and intense interaction creates dense meaning that can resist, survive and repair disruption in 
individuals’ strands of understanding”. The firm needs to strengthen its societal acceptance through 
effective interaction with the society in which it operates (Ramadan and Majdalany, 2013). This paper 
thus argues that the composition of the board provides an important mechanism in enhancing CCID 
and thereby improving the interactions between the firm and its community of operations. This is 
consistent with prior findings in the literature that investigate other forms of corporate disclosure 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2006; Li et al., 2008; Liao et al., 2014).  
This present study can be differentiated from the wealth of literature on corporate governance 
(CG) and disclosure studies. Firstly, previous studies focus on the role of CG in other types of 
voluntary disclosures such as; environmental disclosure (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006), Greenhouses 
gas disclosure (Liao et al., 2014), intellectual capital disclosures (Li et al., 2008; Ramadan and 
Majdalany, 2013), amongst many others. These studies have generated important insights on the nature 
of the interaction between the firm and the society resulting, for example, into better understanding of 
stakeholders’ management.  However, such understandings are issues specific, and although they all 
fall under a broad category of social and environmental accounting (Campbell et al., 2006), each subset 
of this broad category are unique.  Campbell et al., (2006, p.97) argue that community disclosure is 
grossly under-researched “despite its importance as a broadly conceived stakeholder group”. Yet the 
literature clearly recognizes the growing importance of CCI (Marquis et al., 2007; Matten and Crane, 
2005; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011). Although studies on CCID started to emerge (e.g. Campbell et al., 
2006; Yekini and Jallow, 2012), there is still a considerable gap in the literature on the nature of CCID. 
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It is therefore imperative to understand the determinants of this unique disclosure, but more specifically 
to understand the impact of board composition in this regard. 
Secondly, prior CG literature, especially the subset of this literature that focuses on board 
composition/NEDs (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Peng, 2004) concentrates on how 
board composition can ensure corporate financial performance. Also a key feature of these studies is 
the use of US, Singapore, China or Hong Kong data. On the contrary, using a sample of UK firms, this 
current study focuses on the issue of social performance, and especially the alignment of interests 
between the corporation and its community of operation 
Furthermore, CCID is a distinctive form of corporate social disclosure as it relates to the actual 
and tangible interaction between the corporation and their community of operation as opposed to the 
usual broad and general characterization of CSR (Campbell et al., 2006). Given that previous studies 
(Bebbington et al., 2008; Gray et al., 1995; Guthrie et al., 2004; Hackston and Milne 1996; Hasseldine 
et al., 2005; Toms, 2002) argue that loose and general definitions and descriptions of CSR make it 
vague and allow companies to engage in ‘Greenwash’ (green talk and lack of walk), examining the 
specific aspects of firm interactions with their environment provides a clearer indication of their 
corporate social performance. Moreover, understanding the factors that affect such specific disclosure 
through the lenses of the stakeholder theory is crucial, more so now than before, for the achievement of 
corporate objectives, due to the growing sophistication in stakeholder social performance disclosure 
demands (Cooper and Owen 2007; Gray et al., 1988).  
Our paper contributes to the CG, CCI and disclosure quality literature. We find that good CG 
characterized by more outside directors encouraged more transparent CCI disclosure measured by the 
quality of the disclosure. Measuring disclosure quality remains a highly contentious issue in the 
disclosure literature, in which a variety of definitions and measurement exist (Beattie et al., 2004; 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Khiari, 2013). This current study contributes to the debate by suggesting a 
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three-process measure of CCI disclosure quality that is based on i) specific project identification, ii) 
clear and traceable evidence and iii) disclosure location. This approach synthesizes previous efforts 
(Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Hasseldine et al., 2005; Toms, 2002) to improve 
disclosure quality and enhances empirical disclosure studies.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; the next section presents a brief review of the 
literature and theoretical underpinnings, which also leads to the development of the hypothesis to be 
tested, while section three discusses the methodology employed. The findings from the study are 
discussed in section four, while section five summarizes and concludes the study. 
 
2. Previous Studies, Theory and Hypothesis 
2.1. Extant studies on Disclosures/NEDs 
Prior studies (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Peasnell et al., 2005; Peng, 2004) 
suggest several reasons why board composition could influence corporate disclosure. These can be 
broadly categorized as the monitoring and the human capital/litigation risk hypotheses (Fama 1980; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Peasnell et al., 2005). These studies argue that NEDs represent the interest of 
various stakeholders on the board and provide monitoring oversight of management (Ajinkya et al., 
2005; Peasnell et al., 2005). Consequently, as custodians of the company, it is expected that the NEDs 
on the board, acting individually and collectively, would, as part of their responsibilities, monitor the 
type and nature of communication emanating from the firm. This is because they have ultimate 
responsibility for corporate communication. Furthermore, NEDs are likely to suffer human capital 
depletion if they serve on the board of a company with poor or damaging corporate disclosure 
(Bebbington et al., 2008; Fama and Jensen 1983). This could also lead to litigation with serious 
consequences from the point of view of the social and reputational risks (Bebbington et al., 2008). It is 
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therefore reasonable to expect that the NEDs would be interested in and have an impact on the content 
of corporate disclosures.  
Moreover, the board, being composed of people that are independent of the management and 
without financial relationship with the firm (Peasnell et al., 2005), is a very crucial internal control 
mechanism since it protects the interests of the shareholders through its oversight functions on the 
management including corporate communications. From a stakeholder perspective, Mitchell et al., 
(1997) argue that NEDs possess power and legitimacy to influence managers’ activities including the 
adequacy of both financial and narrative disclosures. Empirical evidence supports the existence of 
relationship between NEDs and corporate disclosures even if inconclusive. For example, Chen and 
Jaggi (2000), in a study of Hong Kong listed firms, report a positive relationship between the 
proportion of NEDs on the board and the comprehensiveness of the mandatory financial disclosures. 
They conclude that NEDs precipitate more comprehensive financial disclosure by management in 
companies with low family ownership and control. Similarly, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) show a 
positive relationship between voluntary disclosures and the proportion of independent directors, in the 
presence of a dominant shareholder, for a sample of nonfinancial listed firms on the Italian Stock 
exchange. Conversely, Eng and Mak (2003) demonstrate that an increase in NEDs leads to lower 
voluntary disclosure for a sample of companies listed on the Singapore stock exchange based on 1995 
data. They suggest that there is a substitution effect between the outside director and disclosure by 
monitoring managers for their studied sample.  However, none of these studies considers the 
relationship between NEDs and CCI disclosure. CCID are fundamentally different from conventional 
financial disclosures with regards to their underlying motive and targeted audience. 
Forker (1992), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ho and Wong (2001), and Webb (2004) all argue that 
because NEDs are considered outsiders, it is generally believed that their presence on the board 
represents the interests of other stakeholders such as the local community, employees, suppliers and 
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government agencies rather than just the shareholders. Thus, they will have more effective monitoring 
power (Fama, 1980) and hence have a greater influence on the level and quality of disclosures in 
annual reports regarding other groups of stakeholders (Forker, 1992; Mangena and Pike, 2005) [6]. 
Furthermore, the responsibility for corporate continuity falls with the board of directors, and as Gul and 
Leung (2004, p.354) argue, “Corporate disclosure is primarily a decision that emanates from the 
board”.  However, they also note that many disclosure studies often fail to account for the impact of 
CG, particularly NEDs in their quest to understand the determinants of corporate disclosures. Gaps thus 
exist in our collective knowledge of the impact of CG on corporate disclosure generally but also on 
CCI disclosure in particular. It is therefore important to establish if, indeed, there are any relationships 
between the quality of CCI disclosures and board independence, defined as the proportion of NEDs to 
the total board size. Therefore, the research question posed by this study is:  
 
What impact do independent non-executive directors have on the quality of CCI disclosures?  
 
To answer this question, we contextualized the influence of NEDs on CCID through the lenses of 
stakeholder normative theory and especially its integrative and ethical dimensions (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Freeman and Philips, 2002; Mitchell et al., 1997; Rowley, 1998) discussed in section 2.2 
below.  
2.2. Theoretical context 
Undoubtedly, stakeholder theory has been extensively reviewed in the literature and various 
schools of thought have emerged on the subject (Altman, 2000; Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984; Jensen, 2001; Mitchell et al., 1997). In its broad sense, stakeholder 
theory deals with the relationship between the firm and all groups (stakeholders) that have a vested 
interest in the firm’s activities or product. As such, relevant stakeholders can be any person, group, 
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organisation, institution, society, etc. (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Moreover, these various 
stakeholder groups often have diverse and conflicting objectives, hence, it is often companies’ 
management that decides on the various trade-offs between alternative demands under the normative 
principle of value maximisation [7] (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jensen, 2001). Early expositions of 
the stakeholder theory by Freeman (1984) fail to suggest a strategy for dealing with these trade-offs 
leaving adequate space for criticism (Mitchell et al., 1997; Rowley, 1998). In addition, as managerial 
time and resources are often limited, companies most often are unable to fully engage and manage 
relationship with all stakeholder groups, limiting the practical usefulness of this theoretical framework.  
To solve this problem, Mitchell et al. (1997) narrow down the definition of relevant stakeholder 
groups by proposing a dynamic framework of instrumental stakeholder identification and salience. As 
the authors suggest, salience accorded to specific stakeholders’ claims should be a function of three key 
attributes, namely i) power to influence the firm, ii) a legitimate relationship with the firm, and/or, iii) 
urgency of those claims on the firm. Depending on these attributes, stakeholder groups’ salience may 
be low, moderate or high. Managers ought to know what groups or entities in their environment have 
the power to influence the corporation and as such “power and urgency must be attended to if 
managers were to serve the legal and moral interests of legitimate stakeholders” (Mitchell et al., 1997, 
p.882). Based on this framework, stakeholders can be distinguished amongst seven typologies (Figure 1 
below) ranging from dormant stakeholders which are those that possess only the attribute of power and 
can exercise it via coercive, utilitarian or symbolic means but no urgency of legitimate relationship 
with the firm, to that of definite stakeholders, that possesses all three attributes and require urgent 
attention and engagement from companies’ management.  
Furthermore, the dynamic nature of this framework allows every stakeholder group to move from 
one category to another given the situation. For example a typical dependent stakeholder that possesses 
the attributes of legitimacy and urgency such as a community group can easily become definite 
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stakeholder after acquiring the attribute of power via the acquisition of government support if current 
conditions dictate to do so [8].  
 
Fig. 1. Stakeholder Identification and Salience Model. Source: Adapted from “Toward a theory of Stakeholder Identification 
and Salience: Defining thePrinciple of Who and What really counts” (Mitchell et al., 1997:874). 
 
As regards the role of community within this theoretical framework, under the economic context, 
its importance appears to be secondary following all those stakeholder groups that have a priority of 
claims to the organisation (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984). Nonetheless, subsequent literature 
especially the one investigating the normative aspects of the theory, views community as equal to the 
rest of the key stakeholders, and with legitimate interests, driven theoretically from philosophical 
concepts such as moral ethics, common good, freedom, fairness and justice (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995; Freeman and Philips, 2002). Moreover, as corporate management faces increased pressure from 
governments, media, communities and non-governmental organisation (NGOs), the broad issue of 
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corporate social responsibility has become essential in the corporate agenda with actual social 
performance and disclosures playing an important role (Campbell et al., 2006; Doh et al., 2010; 
Marquis et al., 2007; Trudel and Cotte, 2009). This importance is demonstrated by the increasing 
participation of community influential individuals as NEDs within corporate boards, aiming to increase 
independence and inevitably corporate accountability (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Hillman et al., 2000; 
Spitzeck and Hansen, 2010) [9]. Stressing the importance of community influential NEDs, Hillman et 
al., (2000), argue that such NEDs possesses immense information and experience on the impact of 
organisational activities on community of operation and the expectations of powerful community 
groups. Suffice to say therefore that the presence of these NEDs on corporate boards can contribute 
enormously to corporate legitimacy by facilitating the disclosure of the company’s community 
activities within its community of operation. The key task of this type of NEDs is to ensure sufficient 
corporate social action by the company and communication of same through quality disclosure in the 
annual reports, thus, leading to a good relationship between the firm and the society.   
Therefore, the ethical and integrating dimensions of stakeholder’s theory discussed above offer 
the appropriate theoretical support for the effective evaluation of CCI performance and disclosures. 
This also provides the relevant conceptual framework for this study which lends itself well to 
establishing the importance of disclosing quality information regarding this particular group of 
stakeholders, i.e. the society. Consequently, to answer our research question, our conjecture based on 
the above theoretical literature is that:  
 
H1: Higher number of NEDs leads to higher quality of corporate community involvement (CCI) 
activities and disclosures measured by total Community Disclosure Quality Score (CCIDQ) in 
annual reports ceteris paribus. 
 
 
 
12 
 
2.3. Measuring Community Disclosure Quality (CCIDQ) 
There is a growing body of literature on how to measure or define disclosure quality (Beattie et 
al., 2004; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008).  Consequently, various methods of measurement are used in the 
literature as a measure of disclosure quality. While some authors use analyst ratings (Hasseldine et al., 
2005; Toms, 2002), others have constructed their own index (Beattie et al., 2004; Freedman and 
Stagliano, 1992 and 2008; Walden and Schwartz, 1997; Yekini and Jallow, 2012), taking a great deal of 
factors into consideration. For example, whereas Walden and Schwartz (1997) build their definition of 
disclosure quality on the location of disclosure, the evidence of items disclosed – that is, monetary or 
nonmonetary – and the timing of disclosure, studies by Deegan and Gordon (1996) and Deegan and 
Rankin (1996) define quality by the nature of the news in the disclosure. On the other hand, Gray et al. 
(1995); Hackston and Milne (1996) and Guthrie et al. (2004) all have in common a definition of quality 
that includes themes of disclosure, amount (volume) of disclosure and evidence of disclosure. Beattie et 
al. (2004, p.227) describe disclosure quality as a complex and “multi-faceted concept” while also 
defining it in terms of its attributes: historical/forward-looking, financial/non-financial and quantitative/ 
non-quantitative. 
Following the above discussions, measuring the quality of CCI information disclosed in annual 
reports therefore depends on a number of factors: first, the form of disclosure (factual or narrative) – 
that is, whether financial, physical, or just narrative (Gray et al., 1995; Hackston and Milne, 1996; 
Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Toms, 2002). Disclosure is Physical where traceable evidence in the form of 
actual picture of the community activity is displayed to support the narrative or financial disclosure. 
The inclusion of pictures in a quality measure is considered vital for the purpose of this study. 
Wilmshurst and Frost (2000) argue that a picture is worth more than a thousand words and will convey 
more messages than words. They maintain that pictures might be used by management to convey the 
corporation’s approach to environmental issues and therefore regard its exclusion from their study as a 
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limitation. We consider picture as an important part of CCI disclosure, and include its disclosure in our 
measure of CCID quality. This is a major departure from previous studies and fills an important gap in 
the literature. 
Second, the relevance and importance attached to the disclosure, measured by the location of the 
information in the annual reports. Gray et al. (1995), Kirkman and Hope (1992) and Walden and 
Schwartz (1997) all argue that information located in the chairman’s statements or a separate section of 
the annual reports demonstrates the importance and weight attached to that information and the desire 
of management to have it widely read by all. They argue that items disclosed under the chairman’s 
statement are more likely to be read than any other narrative section of the annual reports. Hence, 
information located in the director’s report and/or review of the year section is an indication that such 
issues are integrated into the mainstream activity or within the core competence of the corporation and 
thus relevant to the business of the corporation (Gray et al., 1995). Furthermore, Kirkman and Hope 
(1992) suggest that issues that are given the same priority as those of the mainstream of the 
organisation and are as such fully integrated into the mainstream activities will normally be disclosed 
in the Directors report and/or the Review of the year sections of the report. Our view is that the quality 
of information disclosed in annual report can be measured by whether the information is factual and by 
the importance and relevance attached to it 
Finally, given the developmental nature of CCI activities, a detailed description of the specific 
CCI activities undertaken by the companies within the community of operation is important in 
measuring the quality of its disclosure. Contrary to Beattie et al.'s (2004, p.230) argument that 
“Companies that say relatively more can be expected to provide disclosure of higher quality”, Yekini 
and Jallow (2012) indicate that specificity and substance rather than the amount of disclosure should 
characterise quality.  Consequently, in this paper, volume is not considered as one of the measures of 
quality. Because CCI disclosure requires actual involvement in community development, this paper 
14 
 
argues that the quality of such disclosure should include a specific description of CCI projects 
undertaken with evidence provided – financial or photographic wherever possible (Campbell et al., 
2006; Hasseldine et al., 2005; Yekini and Jallow, 2012). Measuring disclosure quality will therefore 
require a weighted scoring system that allows us to give a higher score to verifiable disclosures and a 
lower score to general statements that have little or no substance in them (Hasseldine et al., 2005).  
The vast CSR disclosure literature provides no guidance as to the scoring or allocation of points 
to classify disclosure such as this. Moreover, Marston and Shrives (1991, p.207), in their 
comprehensive review of studies that have used a scoring system in accounting disclosure research, 
conclude that most scoring systems involve “subjective judgment on the part of the researchers” and 
could only measure the extent rather than the quality of disclosures. Nevertheless, to measure quality, 
Yekini and Jallow (2012) argue that a differential weighting scheme can be justified by the fact that 
some classifications of disclosure contain more information than others. Consequently, in this paper, 
we measure the quality of CCI disclosure using a quality score obtained on the five-element index; 
specific, factual, important, relevant and general as discussed earlier.  
 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Sample Design 
The sampling frame for this study is the list of the FTSE 350[10] companies. This list is used to 
ensure representativeness. All companies on the list are classified into ten strata [11] using the Industrial 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) [12] structure and code index. These ten industries include: Oil and Gas, 
Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer goods, Health care, Consumer services, Telecommunications, 
Utilities, Financials and Technology. Each of the ten industrial sectors is represented in our sample. 
However, only companies listed before January 2002 are included in the sample, as the investigation 
covers the period 2002 to 2012 inclusive. Ten companies are randomly selected from industries 
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consisting of more than ten companies, while all companies are selected from industries with ten or 
fewer companies. For example, all companies under the Health care, Telecommunications and Utilities 
categories are selected for this reason. This selection procedure gives an initial 95 companies in total. 
However, a total of 22 companies need to be excluded; 7 companies due to their listing dates been 
outside the specification mentioned above, and 15 more companies due to problems of data availability.  
Our final sample consists of 73 companies covering eleven years from 2002 to 2012 (inclusive) giving 
a total of 803 firm-year observations.  
We use only the annual report of companies because we take the view that although firms now 
have variety of ways to communicate their involvement with the community of operation, the annual 
report remains the only mandatory and official source of corporate information to many stakeholders. 
Formal disclosure of CSR activities on firm’s annual reports still functions as a signaling tool of 
company’s future intentions and past engagement with society at large as this form of disclosure is 
often demanded by key corporate stakeholders such as shareholders, community pressure groups, etc. 
(Campbell et al., 2006). 
All data collected are of a panel nature. A panel dataset consists of both cross-sectional and time 
series elements and offers the advantage of controlling for any unobserved heterogeneity that could 
also affect CCID, which could otherwise be omitted if only cross-section or only time series data are 
used (Baltagi, 2005; Halaby, 2004). The panel dataset also lends itself well to rigorous statistical 
analysis such as the Fixed effect (FE) and the Random-Effect (RE). Unlike a normal pooled regression, 
both the FE and RE account for individual heterogeneity in the investigation. However, while FE 
assumes constant individual effects over time, RE in addition assumes the possibility of a time-varying 
individual heterogeneity (Baltagi, 2005; Halaby, 2004; Wooldridge, 2009). For example, the 
unobserved endogenous variables (e.g. management leadership style) that may emanate from the very 
specific culture of the firm and might not have been observed in the course of data collection (Singer 
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and Willett, 2003) can be accounted for using panel study. Controlling for such variables would ensure 
the validity of our results.  
Table 1 below presents the industry classification and number of companies selected from each 
industry, and the list of companies included in the study is presented in Appendix A.  
 
TABLE 1 
Industrial Classification 
Industrial Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) 
Number of 
Companies 
No. of Annual 
Reports 
examined 
Basic Materials.  6 66 
Consumer Goods 10 110 
Consumer Services 8 88 
Financials 8 88 
Health Care 6 66 
Industrials 9 99 
Oil and Gas 6 66 
Technology 8 88 
Telecommunications 5 55 
Utilities 7 77 
 
Total 
 
73 
 
803 
 
 
Table 1, however, indicates an uneven distribution between the ten industrial classifications; for 
instance, though Consumer Goods has as many as ten companies and Industrials has nine companies, 
Telecommunications has only five companies analyzed. In addition, though Consumer Services, 
Financials and Technology have eight companies each analyzed, three other industries – Basic 
Materials, Health Care and Oil and Gas – have six companies each analyzed, and Utilities has seven 
companies. However, this imbalance does not affect the analysis because the use of a panel dataset 
corrects for this inadequacy (Baltagi, 2005). 
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3.2. Data Collection Method  
For the purpose of this study, we adopt a content analysis data collection method. Weber (1988) 
describes content analysis as a data collection method of codifying the content of a narrative report 
using selected criteria or decision rules, thereby deriving a quantitative scale, which then permits 
further analysis. Previous studies on social disclosure (for example, Beattie et al., 2004; Ernst and 
Ernst, 1978; Gray et al., 1995; Guthrie et al., 2004; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Hooks and van Staden, 
2011; Milne and Adler, 1999) have used content analysis as a method of collecting and analyzing data. 
Content analysis is been used in diverse ways to analyze narrative contents in annual reports; these 
include: sentence count (Deegan et al., 2000; Hackston and Milne, 1996); word count (Campbell et al., 
2006; Gray et al., 1995; Yekini and Jallow, 2012) and the constructing of quality score index (Freedman 
and Stagliano, 2008; Walden and Schwartz, 1997; Yekini and Jallow, 2012). We follow Milne and 
Adler’s (1999), advice on maintaining clear coding instructions to enhance reliability of this study 
based on content analysis. Coding was undertaken by three experienced researchers who are 
particularly familiar with content analysis-based investigations and was done over several months 
allowing for greater accuracy and consistency.  Inter-coder agreement (alpha co-efficient) calculated 
based on the method outlined in Krippendorff (1980. Pp138-139) is over 85%.  
Content analysis is particularly useful in this study as it enables the construction of analytical 
categories of the content of CCID in each annual report and thus allow for the quantitative analysis of 
each category of CCID. The categories of CCID are patterned after Ernst and Ernst, 1978 and Gray et 
al., 1995 (Appendix B). This is to ensure that the categories are mutually exclusive and that 
classifications into categories are not discretionary (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Ingram and Frazier, 1980) 
and thus allow for reproducibility. 
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TABLE 2 
Community Involvement Disclosure Classification (Quality measure) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Yekini and Jallow, 2012) 
 
Data are collected on CCI activities as disclosed in the annual reports of sampled companies 
based on the five-element index displayed in Table 2 above. The index is constructed using content 
analysis and patterned after Freedman and Stagliano, (1992, p.115 and 2008, p.480-481) and Walden 
and Schwartz, (1997, p.151). Similarly, the five measures of quality described as specific, factual, 
important, relevant and general; although unique to this study, they are adopted from the definition of 
quality measures discussed in detail in Section 2.3 above. To collect the data, the authors identified the 
specific mention of the CCI activity undertaken as described in the decision rules (Appendix B) and 
awarded one point for each category described. In addition, the presence of each sub-element of the 
Factual, Importance and Relevant measures are awarded one point each. Therefore, each CCI 
disclosure in a particular annual report can receive a minimum of zero points and a maximum of ten 
points. These scores are then summed to obtain the variable CCI Disclosure Quality (CCIDQ).  
 
 Disclosure Classification Max 
Score 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Specific – Detailed description of any category of CCI (1 point for 
each category mentioned as per Appendix B)       
Factual – Provision of photographic and/or quantitative information 
about CCI (1 points for each). 
Important – Disclosed under chairman’s statement and/or separate 
section of annual reports (1 points for each) 
Relevant –  Disclosed in the director’s reports and/or review of the 
year section (1 points for each) 
General statement of the company’s CCI activities (no point 
allocated) 
 
   4 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
    
0 
 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐲	𝐃𝐢𝐬𝐜𝐥𝐨𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐞	𝐐𝐮𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲    10 
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3.3. Control variables  
To test the hypothesis, we control for other CG variables demonstrated as important in 
determining corporate disclosures in general in previous studies such as Song and Windram (2004); 
Webb (2004); Yermack (1996). These include measures of board activities and efficiency such as board 
size, board meeting frequency, audit committee size, audit committee meeting frequency and the 
existence of other standing committees.  
Board size represents board monitoring capacity and the potential for varied expertise on the 
board (Song and Windram 2004; Yermack 1996). Ceteris paribus, a larger board size is primarily 
indicative of larger board capacity but could also be indicative of the diversity in the skills and 
expertise that can be brought to the board in its deliberation, as well as in the discharge of its oversight 
functions. However, a larger board could be counterproductive due to process loss arising from 
extended discussions and red tape, which may lead to a sluggish decision-making process (Song and 
Windram, 2004; Yermack, 1996).  Previous studies report conflicting results on the impact of board 
size on corporate disclosure. For instance, Webb (2004) provides evidence that larger boards are more 
effective in CG processes and could therefore help to ensure thorough consideration of CSR issues. 
Other studies such as those of Song and Windram (2004) and Yermack (1996) argue that smaller board 
sizes are more effective on the grounds that they allow for smarter and faster decision making 
compared to large boards. We anticipate a statistically positive relationship between board size and 
CCID disclosure. Similarly, there is a theoretical expectation of a relationship between board meeting 
frequency and disclosure. Board meeting frequency could be indicative of board diligence, and this 
could have a direct impact on monitoring effectiveness. Board meeting frequency is used in many 
previous studies (Cormier et al., 2010; Evans et al., 2002; Vafeas, 1999; Webb, 2004) as an important 
measure of board diligence and effectiveness. Following the argument that boards with outside 
directors tend to meet more frequently (Jensen, 1993; Vafeas, 1999) and are thus more effective in 
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handling social issues, we control for board meeting frequency and anticipate a statistically positive 
relationship with CCID.  
The audit committee is an important part of the internal CG mechanism in the firm, with 
oversight function on management. This is primarily in financial reporting and auditing but also in the 
issues surrounding internal control and risk management. The impact of audit committee characteristics 
such as size and meeting frequency is researched extensively in studies on financial reporting and 
auditing. However, there are a handful of studies that consider the impact of the audit committee on 
corporate social disclosures. This may be because they are perceived not to be directly related to 
corporate financial performance. However, there are several extant studies (Bebbington et al., 2008; 
Mitchell et al., 1997; Clarkson, 1995) that highlight the importance of corporate social activities and 
disclosures, especially in relation to corporate risk management, which is one of the remits of the 
committee.  Although there is a dearth of empirical evidence on the impact of audit committee size on 
CSR disclosures, the evidence on the impact of audit committee size on disclosures in annual reports is 
generally mixed. While some studies report no significant relationship (Abbott et al., 2004; Bedard et 
al., 2004; Mangena and Pike, 2005), some suggest a positive relationship (Forker, 1992; Persons, 2009) 
and Song and Windram, (2004) report a negative one. Nevertheless, we control for audit committee 
size following the recommendation of both the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and the Smith 
committee (2003). Both recommend that audit committees should contain at least three (3) outside 
directors. We anticipate a statistically positive relationship between this proxy and CCID. 
Furthermore, the frequency of meetings of the audit committees is found to have a great effect on 
the committee effectiveness. For instance, Abbott et al. (2004) suggest that audit committees that meet 
at least four times annually are more effective in reducing financial reporting re-statements than those 
with lower meeting frequency. Similarly, Persons (2009) finds that firms with earlier voluntary ethics 
disclosures are those for which audit committees met at least four times annually, with at least three 
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audit committee members. Carcello (2008) argues that audit committee meeting frequency can be a 
good measure of audit committee diligence and effectiveness in the monitoring of management 
activities and calls into question the diligence of an audit committee that rarely meets. Li et al. (2008) 
also finds a strong association between the disclosure of intellectual capital and both audit committee 
size and audit committee meetings’ frequency. The current paper argues that the presence and activities 
of the audit committee should be complementary to the activities of the board in enhancing corporate 
social action, thus resulting in more CCI disclosure, and therefore should be controlled for. We thus 
anticipate a statistically positive relationship between audit committee meeting frequency and CCID.  
Although there is a lack of literature on the effect of the existence of other board committees on 
social disclosures, Cowen et al. (1987) examine the effect of the existence of social responsibility 
(CSR) committees, arguing that there is a higher tendency for more social disclosure with the existence 
of such committees. Their findings also indicate that the existence of a CSR committee is associated 
with human resource disclosure. They therefore argue that past studies on the determinants of social 
disclosure with the omission of this variable are misleading because different types of disclosure may 
be motivated by the presence of certain committees. This finding is consistent with that of Petrovic-
Lazarevic (2010), who suggests an enhanced CG structure encompassing a board-level CSR 
committee. The author argues that such a committee “ensures that the social values of the organization 
are aligned with those of the community” (Petrovic-Lazarevic, 2010, p.115) and consequently, the 
existence of a CSR committee may also influence the quality of CCI disclosures. Against this 
background, in this study we control for the effect of standing committees on CCI disclosure by 
including the CSR, Disclosure and Risk committees in our model. We anticipate a statistically positive 
relationship between the presence of these committees and CCID. Consequently, all other things being 
equal, we hypothesized in the null form as follows: 
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H2a: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between Community Disclosure Quality 
and board activities and efficiency measured by board size.  
 
H2b: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between Community Disclosure Quality 
and board activities and efficiency measured by the frequency of board meetings.  
 
H3a: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between Community Disclosure Quality 
and the audit committee activity measured by the size of the audit committee.  
 
H3b: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between Community Disclosure Quality 
and the audit committee activity measured by the frequency of the audit committee’s meetings.  
 
H4: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between Community Disclosure Quality 
and the existence of other board standings committees measured by the presence of a Disclosure 
Committee, Risk Committee and CSR Committee.  
As regards firm-specific characteristics, this study uses four proxy variables – size, profitability, 
leverage level and listing age. These variables are used extensively in the literature (see, for example, 
Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Garcia-Castro et al., 2010; Gray et al., 1995; Hackston and Milne, 1996). 
These studies argue that larger firms are under more pressure to disclose social information, as it is 
expected that their activities will have a greater impact on society than smaller companies.  Their levels 
of operations are higher and consequently more likely to create more negative externalities. 
Additionally, the societal stake is higher for these companies as they have more visibility than smaller 
ones. We proxy firm size with the natural log of turnover and anticipate a statistically positive 
relationship between firm size and CCID. 
Although findings on the relationship between firm performance and disclosure performance 
are inconclusive, some studies suggest an association between performance and social disclosure 
(Galbreath et al., 2008; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), though others did not (Hackston and Milne, 1996; 
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Hasseldine et al., 2005; Ho and Wong, 2001). Nevertheless, this paper argues that good economic 
performance is a good incentive for more disclosure, as profitable companies have better stories to tell 
and are more able to afford the cost of disclosure. In addition, Hackston and Milne (1996) argue that a 
CSR/performance relationship could be an indication of management ability to respond to and meet 
social pressure. We proxy firm performance with return on equity and anticipate a statistically positive 
relationship between the proxy and CCID.  
Similarly, prior literature also reports conflicting results on the relationship between leverage 
and corporate disclosure. Some studies suggest a positive relationship (Galbreath et al., 2008; Tsamenyi 
et al., 2007), while others find no statistical relationship at all (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010; Mangena and 
Pike, 2005). However, we anticipate a statistically positive relationship between leverage and CCID 
because highly geared companies are likely to disclose more to pacify their lenders and signal 
transparency in reporting.  Furthermore, the authors control for listing age because previous studies 
found a statistically significant relationship between disclosures in annual reports and the length of time 
a corporation has been listed on the stock exchange (Li et al., 2008).  However, an earlier study 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) found no significant relationship between disclosures and listing age. 
Nevertheless, this paper argues that the age of a corporation may influence its interaction and 
involvement with its community of operation. We therefore control for this variable and anticipate a 
statistically positive relationship between listing age and CCID because older companies are more 
likely to take corporate social disclosure seriously and are more likely to have the mechanisms and 
system in place to foster this compared to younger companies. Accordingly the hypothesis for these 
firm specific characteristics is stated in null form below: 
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H5: There is a statistically significant positive relationship between Community Disclosure Quality 
and firm-specific characteristics measured by the companies’ Size, Profitability, Leverage Level and 
Listing Age. 
 
Based on the above arguments, our RE regression model is algebraically formulated as:  
 CCIDQit	=	α₀	+	β₁NEDsit	+	β₂BoardSizeit	+	β₃BoardMeetingit	+	β₄AuditMeetingit	+																						β₅AuditSizeit	+	β₆CSRCommitteeit	+	β₇DisclosureCommitteeit	+																						β₈RiskCommitteeit	+	β₉LnTurnoverit	+	β₁₀ROE	+	β₁₁Leverageit	+																					β₁₂Ageit	+	εit																								                                                                                                     (Eq.1)	
 
 
where [13], CCIDQ is the Corporate Community Involvement Disclosure Quality score; NEDs is the 
proportion of total independent non-executive directors to the total number of directors on the board; 
BoardSize is the total number of directors on the board; BoardMeeting is the number of board meetings 
in a given year; AuditMeeting is the number of audit committee meetings in a given year; AuditSize is 
the number of Audit committee members; CSRCommittee is a dichotomous variable with 1 for a 
presence of a CSR committee and 0 for otherwise; DisclosureCommittee is a dichotomous variable 
with 1 for presence of a disclosure committee and 0 for otherwise; RiskCommittee is a dichotomous 
variable with 1 for presence of a stand-alone risk committee and 0 for otherwise; LnTurnover is a proxy 
of company’s size, measured by the natural logarithm of turnover (DataStream mnemonic code 
WC01001); ROE is a proxy for corporate financial performance (DataStream mnemonic code of 
WC08301); Leverage is the company’s gearing ratio representing their exposure to short and long term 
risk and measured by the ratio of total debt to total capital (DataStream mnemonic code WC08221); 
and finally, Age is the number of years since a company first listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
The analysis is carried out using the Random Effects (RE) estimator with Generalized Least 
Square (GLS) regression after performing the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. The test 
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produces a significant result at the 1% level (see Appendix C), indicating that the RE estimator is valid 
and efficient in handling this analysis. The Breusch-Pagan LM test is a diagnostic test that was 
specifically designed to test the appropriateness of the RE models in addressing unobserved 
heterogeneity (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). Although the result of the test are significant at the 1% level 
in favor of the RE estimator, in addition to the Breusch-Pagan LM test, the regression was run with the 
robust standard errors, which automatically adjust all standard errors and p-values for any possible 
effect of heteroskedasticity, outliers and any other irregularities. This improves the validity of our 
findings.  
 
4. Results and Analysis 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the total quality score for CCI disclosure (CCIDQ) and the 
proportion of NEDs by industry are reported in Table 3, Panels A and B. Similarly, the statistics for all 
continuous independent variables and the dichotomous variables are presented in Tables 4 and 5, 
respectively. Table 3, Panel A reveals that a typical company in the sample has an average CCIDQ 
Score of 3.71, with companies in Technology having the lowest average score of 1.98 (median score of 
2) and companies in Financial having the highest average score of 4.7 (median score of 5). In addition, 
whereas some companies in the Consumer service industry were able to obtain the highest quality score 
of 10, the highest quality score obtained in the Technology industry was 6.  
These statistics suggest that companies in certain industries such as Consumer goods, Consumer 
services and Utilities are able to make very high-quality CCI disclosures as against companies in 
industries such as Technology and Industrials.  
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistic by Industry 
Panel A 
 Community Disclosure Quality 
Industries Mean Std Dev Min Max Median 
      
Basic Materials  3.71 2.25 0 7 4 
Consumer Goods 3.94 2.20 0 9 4 
Consumer Services 4.53 1.91 0 10 5 
Financials 4.70 2.02 0 8 5 
Health Care 3.86 2.45 0 8 4 
Industrials 2.89 2.22 0 7 3 
Oil and Gas 3.44 2.27 0 8 4 
Technology 1.98 2.09 0 6 2 
Telecommunication 3.42 2.48 0 8 4 
Utilities 4.67 2.16 0 9 5 
Total 3.71 2.34 0 10 4 
 
Panel B 
 Non-Executive Directors (Outside Directors)*  
Industries Mean Std Dev Min Max Median 
      
Basic Materials  0.67 0.165 0.40 0.93 0.66 
Consumer Goods 0.61 0.170 0.00 0.88 0.63 
Consumer Services 0.60 0.131 0.33 0.82 0.59 
Financials 0.60 0.097 0.38 0.80 0.59 
Health Care 0.73 0.076 0.50 0.88 0.75 
Industrials 0.57 0.103 0.33 0.80 0.56 
Oil and Gas 0.61 0.140 0.33 0.82 0.60 
Technology 0.54 0.133 0.26 0.80 0.56 
Telecommunication 0.68 0.135 0.40 0.89 0.67 
Utilities 0.60 0.112 0.30 0.90 0.57 
Total 0.61 0.139 0.00 0.93 0.60 
*Outside Director is measured by proportion of total independent non-executive directors to total directors on the board per industry 
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This could be because these industries usually locate their companies within close proximity to 
consumers, which is consistent with the findings of Campbell et al., (2006) who found that companies 
with close proximity with consumers tend to disclose more CCI. Similarly, Panel B indicates that 
companies in the Technology and Industrial sectors have the lowest average percentage of NEDs, thus 
indicating that the companies with lower quality disclosure also have a lower proportion of NEDs. 
 
TABLE 4 
Descriptive Statistic for Continuous Independent Variables 
 
Variables 
 
Mean 
Std     
Dev Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
NEDs 0.61 0.14 0 0.93 -0.435 4.336 
BoardSize 10.3 2.94 5 18 0.409 2.640 
BoardMeeting 8.37 2.68 2 16 0.562 3.034 
AuditMeeting 3.75 1.26 1 6 0.283 2.199 
AuditSize 4.00 1.192 2 8 0.793 3.623 
Turnover (£’m) 7,427.25 17,747.3 6.955 196,057.3 6.130 49.36 
ROE (%) 16.50 17.92 -25.32 53.42 0.054 3.151 
Leverage (%) 39.09 25.59 0 98.8 0.249 2.406 
Age (yrs) 23.08 19.04 1 65 0.782 2.253 
 
 
Table 4 above indicates that the board members of the majority of the companies sampled 
comprises of an average of 61% NEDs, with a maximum of 93% in some companies, while BoardSize 
ranges from 5 to 18 members, with an average of 10 board members. Similarly, many companies in the 
sample have an average of 4 Audit Committee members, with some companies having as many as 8 
members. The average for audit committee meetings is 4, with some having as many as 6 meetings in a 
year. Board meeting frequency ranges from 2 to 16 meetings in a year, with an average of 8 meetings 
per year. Turnover for companies sampled ranges between £6.9m and £196bn, with the average in the 
region of £7bn. In addition, the profitability measure (ROE) is approximately 16% for the majority of 
companies in the sample. The gearing ratio for many companies is in the region of 39%. The average 
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listing age of companies in the sample is 23. Table 5 below reveals that approximately 32% of 
companies sampled have a CSR committee during the period covered in the investigation, while only 
21% of sampled companies have a disclosure committee and 31% have a risk committee. 
 
TABLE 5 
Descriptive Statistic for Dichotomous Independent Variables 
 
  Std       Counts  
Variables Mean Dev 0 1 N 
CSR Committee 0.322 0.467 545 258 803 
Disclosure Committee 0.211 0.408 634 169 803 
Risk Committee 0.313 0.464 552 251 803 
 
 
Furthermore, Table 4 displays the presence of outliers [14] in turnover. Further tests conducted to 
confirm this include plotting the box plot [15] of turnover data. Our checks confirmed the presence of 
outliers (see Appendix D for the graphical results of the box plot). Turnover was therefore log-
transformed to correct the problem (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Other tests conducted to ensure the 
datasets meet the normality assumption included the visual analysis of the studentized residuals (r) 
using a histogram (Appendix E). The histogram indicates r as normally distributed.  
 
4.2. Correlation Matrix 
Table 6 presents the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables. The table indicates low 
correlation between all the variables. This is suggestive of the fact that collinearity, if at all present, 
should be minimal among the independent variables. Nevertheless, the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
was computed for all variables to check for the existence of collinearity. 
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TABLE 6 
Correlation Matrix of the Explanatory Variables 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
1.NEDs 
 
1.000           
2.BoardSize 0.191 1.000          
3.BoardMeeting -0.025 0.048 1.000         
4.AuditMeeting 0.360 0.383 0.240 1.000        
5.AuditSize 0.324 0.451 0.091 0.246 1.000       
6.CSRCommittee 0.199 0.243 0.106 0.319 0.223 1.000      
7.DisclosureCom 0.254 0.334 0.147 0.411 0.143 0.340 1.000     
8.RiskCommittee 0.078 0.039 0.043 0.253 -0.003 0.082 0.152 1.000    
9.LnTurnover 0.205 0.635 0.221 0.540 0.461 0.294 0.347 0.164 1.000   
10.ROE -0.009 0.069 0.077 0.083 0.051 0.110 0.149 0.011 0.197 1.000  
11.Leverage 0.038 0.192 0.102 0.131 0.236 0.088 0.076 0.062 0.361 0.129 1.000 
12.Age 0.052 0.191 0.074 0.264 0.298 0.096 0.107 0.076 0.433 0.094 0.229 
 
 
4.3. Regression Results and Discussions 
The regression results are presented in Table 7. The results indicate that our model is able to 
explain approximately 28% of the overall variation in the quality of CCI activities disclosed in the 
annual reports of the sampled companies. In addition, the model is able to explain 17% of variation 
within an entity from one year to another and approximately 40% of the variations between one entity 
and another entity. The results also indicate a rho of 0.359. The rho measures the intergroup correlation 
(Greene, 2008). The results reveal that approximately 36% of variations in CCI disclosure quality 
cannot be explained by differences across entities. Whilst our overall R2 is low it is generally consistent 
with the results from previous studies in this research area. For example, Ajinkya et al. (2005); Cormier 
et al. (2010); Chen and Jaggi (2000) document R2 of 20%, 27% and 30 % respectively. The low 
explanatory power in our model may be due to the exploratory nature of our investigation.  However, 
before placing total reliance on these results in testing our hypothesis, further post-estimation tests were 
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conducted to examine the validity of the results by checking the suitability of the RE GLS estimator 
(see discussion in section 3.3 above). 
 
TABLE 7 
RE-GLS Regression Results with all independent variables  
 
Variables 
 
Coefficients 
Robust    
Std. Error z – start P-value VIF 
Constant -2.305 0.570 -4.04 0.000***  
NEDs 2.403 0.670 3.59 0.000*** 1.31 
Board Size 0.053 0.044 1.20 0.230 1.94 
Board Meeting -0.009 0.028 -0.30 0.761 1.13 
Audit Meeting 0.223 0.076 2.93 0.003*** 1.81 
Audit Size -0.217 0.083 -2.60 0.009*** 1.55 
CSR Committee 0.513 0.187 2.74 0.006*** 1.22 
Disclosure Committee -0.331 0.222 -1.49 0.136 1.38 
Risk Committee 0.399 0.219 1.82 0.068* 1.09 
 
Firm specific characteristics: 
LnTurnover 0.423 0.085 4.97 0.000*** 2.74 
ROE 0.002 0.004 0.54 0.586 1.07 
Leverage 0.006 0.004 1.44 0.151 1.18 
Age 0.021 0.009 2.43 0.015** 1.31 
      
R2:   Within      = 0.170  χ2              = 204.57***   
        Between   = 0.403  Rho          = 0.359   
        Overall     = 0.275  N              =  798   
 
Notes: This table reports the results of our examination of the link between Community Involvement Disclosure score 
(CCIDQ) and various independent variables estimated as CCIDit= a1+ b1NEDsit+ b2BoardSizeit+ b3Boardmeetingit+ 
b4AuditMeetingit+ b5AuditSizeit+ b6CSRCommitteeit+ b7DisclosureCommitteeit+ b8RiskCommitteeit+ b9LnTurnoverit+ 
b10ROEit+ b11Leverageit+ b12Ageit+ eit; where, CCIDQ is the Community Involvement Disclosure score; NEDs is the 
pro-portion of total independent non-executive directors to the total number of directors on the board; Board Size is the total 
number of directors on the board; Board Meeting is the number of board meetings in a given year; Audit Meeting is the 
number of audit committee meetings in a given year; Audit Size is the number of Audit committee members; CSR 
Committee, Disclosure Committee and Risk Committee are dichotomous variables with 1 for the presence of such 
committee and 0 for otherwise. LnTurnover is a proxy for company’s size, measured by the natural logarithm of turnover; 
ROE is a proxy for corporate financial performance; Leverage is the company’s gearing ratio representing their exposure to 
short and long term risk and measured by the ratio of total debt to total capital; and finally, Age is the number of years since 
a company first listed on the London Stock Exchange. CCIDQ is the dependent variable. 
      (p > 0.10) = Not Significant 
    *(p ≤ 0.10) = Significant at 10% 
  **(p ≤ 0.05) = Significant at 5% 
***(p ≤ 0.01) = Significant at 1% 
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4.4. Community Disclosure Quality and Outside Directors (NEDs) 
Our results reveal that NEDs have a coefficient of 2.403 indicating a strong positive relationship 
with CCIDQ and highly significant at the 1% level, thus confirming hypothesis H1. The positive 
relationship implies that companies with a board constituting a proportion of NEDs of 60% and greater 
are likely to disclose higher quality CCI activity than those with fewer NEDs. This explains why 
companies in the Technology and Industrial sectors disclosed very low-quality CCI activities as 
indicated by the descriptive statistics in Table 3, Panel A. This positive relationship is consistent with 
the findings of previous studies such as Ajinkya et al., (2005), Webb (2004), and, Yekini and Jallow 
(2012). The results appear to confirm the arguments of Forker (1992), Galbreath et al. (2008), Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002), Ho and Wong (2001) and Webb (2004) that because directors are outsiders, they are 
on the board to represent the interests of other stakeholders such as community stakeholders and would 
therefore influence management to disclose more CCI activities in the interests of the community 
stakeholders. This is also consistent with the argument of Mitchell et al. (1997) that outside directors 
possess power and legitimacy by virtue of their standing in the company and would therefore have an 
influence on board decisions, which was why Altman (2000) described them as the community group 
that cannot be ignored in the stakeholder system. 
 
4.5. Other CG Measures 
The regression results indicate that board size (coeff 0.05; p-value 0.230) and board meetings 
(coeff -0.009; p-value 0.761) are inconsequential in CCI disclosure. Although these relationships are 
not statistically significant and thus require cautious interpretation, a possible explanation for the 
inverse relationship between board meeting frequency and CCIDQ may be that board meetings only 
increase following low-quality CCI disclosures in annual reports. The result is consistent with the 
findings of Vafeas (1999) and confirms the assertion by Jensen (1993) that boards in performing 
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corporations are generally inactive and only become active in the incidence of crisis. The positive 
BoardSize/CCIDQ relationship may be consistent with the argument that larger boards allow for 
rigorous debate in the consideration of issues, which lends itself to a better resolution of conflicting 
issues (Galbreath et al., 2008). Nonetheless, the result supports the findings of Webb (2004) and 
Galbreath et al. (2008), who found evidence that larger boards are more effective in CG processes than 
smaller boards, as opposed to Yermack, (1996) and Song and Windram, (2004), whose evidence was in 
favor of smaller boards. These empirical findings indicate that both hypotheses H2a and H2b should be 
rejected. 
Equally, we find a statistically significant negative (coeff -0.217; p-value 0.009***) relationship 
between audit committee size and CCIDQ consistent with Song and Windram (2004). On the other 
hand, we report a statistically significant positive relationship between audit committee meeting 
frequency (coeff 0.223; p-value 0.003***) and CCIDQ.  This suggests that the frequency of the 
meeting of the committee is associated with an increase in the quality of CCI disclosures, whereas audit 
committee size is associated with less CCID quality. This may be because the committee is more 
concerned with financial reporting than corporate community involvement.  Therefore, hypothesis H3a 
is rejected but hypothesis H3b is accepted. 
 
4.6. The Existence of Other Standing Committee 
The results indicate a significant positive relationship (at the 1% level, with a co-efficient of 
0.513) between the existence of CSR comm0ittees and CCIDQ. The possible implication is that the 
CSR committees have a stronger influence on CCIDQ because they are established for the 
administration of CSR issues. This result is consistent with Cowen et al. (1987), who report CSR 
committee having a strong association with human resources information. Similarly, the standalone risk 
committee is found to have a marginally significant positive relationship with CCIDQ. Furthermore, 
33 
 
the existence of a disclosure committee is not significantly related to the quality of CCI disclosure. This 
could be because it is not a prerequisite to listing in the UK.  Hence, H4 is accepted for the case of the 
CSR committee but rejected for the case of all other standings committees, i.e. the risk and disclosure 
committees.    
 
4.7. Firm-Specific Characteristics 
The result indicates that CCIDQ is significantly associated with turnover and listing age at the 
1% and 5% significance levels, with coefficients of 0.423 and 0.021 respectively. We find no 
significant relationship between CCIDQ and leverage and firm performance. The regression results 
indicate an insignificant relationship with ROE and leverage. This could mean larger firms that are well 
established will more likely disclose high-quality CCI activities than younger and smaller ones who are 
highly geared and less profitable. Nevertheless, the insignificant CCIDQ/ROE relationship is consistent 
with studies such as Hackston and Milne (1996); Ho and Wong (2001); Hasseldine et al. (2005); Yekini 
and Jallow (2012), who also documented no statistical relationship. Similarly, the positive 
Age/disclosure relationship is consistent with the findings in Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Galbreath 
et al. (2008), although these studies reported no statistical relationship between social disclosure and 
listing age. Furthermore, the positive but insignificant leverage/disclosure relationship is consistent 
with findings from Tsamenyi et al. (2007) and Galbreath et al. (2008). These results are indicative of 
the ambiguity in the relationship between firm-specific variables and disclosure measures.  Based on 
these findings, H5 is rejected.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
The primary aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between non-executive directors 
(NEDs), also known as outside directors, and the quality of the CCI activities disclosed (CCID) in 
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annual reports. This was necessitated by the fact that outside directors constitute for the most part 
community leaders in the majority of large corporations (Mitchell et al., 1997). Accordingly, Mitchell 
et al. (1997) argued that it is their responsibility to represent the interests of their community at the 
board level and to “maintain good relationships” between the corporation and its local community and 
the government (Mitchell et al., 1997, p.877). Therefore, the authors expected a relationship to exist 
between NEDs and not just with the extent of CCID but also with the quality of CCID (CCIDQ). The 
findings from this study not only confirm this expectation but also suggest that CCIDQ, responds to 
other CG monitoring mechanisms such as audit committee activities and the existence of other standing 
committees. Indeed the study revealed that CCIDQ responds more to some of the standing committees, 
such as the CSR committee, than to board activities. The plausible explanation for this may be in line 
with the argument of Vafeas (1999) that many of the monitoring tasks of the board have been delegated 
to the standing committees; therefore, the boards are left with the coordination of standing committee 
activities rather than the direct monitoring of management, which explains why NEDs was the only 
significant variable among the other variables measuring board activities.  
The paper is novel in that it is the first to specifically examine the link between outside directors 
and CCID in annual reports and contributes both to the CG and CCID literature. We find that good CG, 
characterised by more NEDs, encourages higher disclosure quality and transparency. Our study also 
provides a clear synthesis of previous disclosure studies, and contributes to quality measurement by 
proposing a three-process system. This is based on specific project identification, clear and traceable 
evidence and disclosure location. Future disclosure studies should consider using this three-process 
approach in arriving at a disclosure quality measurement. Other disclosure quality measurements 
documented in literature, focused predominantly on the extent rather than the real quality and substance 
of the disclosure (Yekini and Jallow 2012). Our three-process approach addresses this limitation by 
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ensuring that disclosure quality measurement is verifiable rather than based on subjective judgments 
with minimal or no substance in them (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
In addition, given the recent global demand for transparency in governance and accountability, 
this paper is timely as it addresses the issue of governance structure, pointing to the need and 
importance of including more independent non-executive directors in the governance process. 
Furthermore, it offers rich and important insight to policy makers who are interested in achieving 
optimal board composition and those who are interested in the interaction of the firm with its corporate 
and extended environment through high quality disclosures. 
One limitation of this study, however, is the fact that the study focused on disclosures in annual 
reports alone. Future research may consider data from other corporate communication media such as 
standalone CSR reports or press releases. Again, the study concentrates on UK companies alone and 
therefore may not be applicable to other countries, especially developing countries, which are 
characterised by little or no CG structure in place. This is because most markets and institutions in 
developing countries are informal and quite different from markets and institutions in developed 
countries like the UK. We therefore suggest that future research examine the link between CCIDQ and 
outside directors using samples from developing countries. Finally, other factors might have influenced 
CCIDQ, which we have not considered. Overall, this study shows that having community influential 
NEDs on the board provides an important mechanism in enhancing CCIDQ and thereby improving the 
interactions between the firm and its environment. 
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NOTES 
1 The term corporate legitimacy as elegantly defined by Suchman (1995, p.574) “ is a generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs and definitions”. 
2 In contrast to the literature on board composition for profit-orientated organisations, the role and contribution of 
community leaders in non-profit organisations is well documented (Provan, 1980; Garonzik, 1999; Alexander et al., 
2000; Ingram, 2003). 
3 In the study of Hillman and Keim (2001), the variable ‘Diversity’ reflects issues such as the employment of women and 
minorities, existence of outstanding benefit programs addressing work/family concerns, taking over of innovative hiring 
initiatives or other programs directed at employment of the disabled, etc. 
4 Other ways through which community leaders could impact corporate action include corporate philanthropic decisions, 
appreciation of the impact of corporate action on community of operation and consequently leading to change in 
corporate strategy. 
5 We used corporate community involvement and corporate social action interchangeably in this paper because they 
essentially are referring to the same issue(s). 
6 This is consistent with their classification as dominant stakeholders by Mitchell et al. (1997) examined in section 2.2. 
7 As Jensen (2001) argues, at theoretical level stakeholder theory appears to be consistent with the value maximisation 
principle. This principle dictates that any additional $1 spent should result in a minimum of $1 long-term value added to 
the business. Hence, under the stakeholder theory framework any amount spent by the company on each constituent 
should aim to maximise the financial benefit of this expenditure in the long term. 
8 A characteristic example is the case of British Petroleum Plc where the company was forced by the US government to 
set up a $20bl Trust Fund and already has paid $11bl to individuals and local businesses that are affected by the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. 
9 A more recent example is the case of Ireland where following the financial crisis of 2007, the government introduced, via 
the Credit Institutions Financial Support Scheme 2008, compulsory ‘public interest directors’ to all institutions that 
needed government’s financial support. Their task was to enhance independence in the corporate decision by aligning 
the views of the existing BoDs to that of the outside stakeholders (Spitzeck and Hansen, 2010).   
10 The FTSE indices are produced quarterly by the FTSE Group. The group is owned jointly by the Financial Times and 
the London Stock Exchange. The indices are intended to provide investors, financial advisers, fund managers, etc. with 
information to enable them to identify and track market trends and make investment decisions. The companies in the 
FTSE 350 index are ranked as the largest 350 UK companies, with their primary listing on the LSE based on their 
market capitalization. Only companies with a full listing on the LSE are eligible to be included in the ranking.  
11 This method of sampling is referred to as the Stratified Sampling technique; it involves dividing the population into 
homogeneous subgroups and then taking a simple random sample in each subgroup (Trochim, 2006).  
12 The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is jointly owned by the FTSE International Ltd and the Dow Jones and 
Co (DJ). The ICB structure and code index is used in both the FTSE and DJ indices for the classification of companies 
into sectors and industries. For the purposes of this study, the structure and code was accessed on 7 October 2012 and 
downloaded from http://www.icbenchmark.com/Site/ICB_Structure 
13All data were sourced from company annual reports, Thompson Reuters Datastream and Lexis Library. 
14Outliers are unusual observations found in datasets due to the existence of very large and very small data with very wide 
and unequal variations. The presence of outliers in datasets may lead to the violation of some of the assumptions of the 
least squares regression. 
15 A box plot summarizes the 25th percentile (that is the 1st quartile), the 50th percentile, also known as the median, and the 
75th percentile (the 3rd quartile) using a box and lines. A normally distributed variable will have its 25th and 75th 
percentile symmetrical, while its median and mean will be located at the same point in the center of the box (Park, 
2008). 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Companies Included in the Final Sample 
 1 3i Group 38 Marks and Spencer Group 
2 Amec 39 Melrose Resources 
3 Antofagasta 40 National Grid  
4 ARM Holdings 41 Pace 
5 AstraZeneca 42 Pearson 
6 Aveva Group 43 Pennon 
7 Barclays 44 Premier Oil 
8 BBA Aviation 45 Provident Financial 
9 BHP 46 Prudential 
10 BP  47 Rio Tinto 
11 British Airways 48 Rolls-Royce Group 
12 British American Tobacco  49 RSA Insurance Group 
13 BT GROUP                            50 SABMiller 
14 BTG 51 Severn Trent 
15 Cairn Energy 52 Shire 
16 Carillion 53 Smith and Nephew 
17 Centrica 54 Soco International 
18 Computacenter 55 Spectris 
19 Cookson Group 56 SSL International 
20 Dairy Crest Group 57 Tate and Lyle 
21 Diageo 58 Tesco 
22 Dimension Data Holdings 59 Tomkins 
23 Dominos Pizza 60 Unilever 
24 Fidessa 61 United Utilities Group 
25 FirstGroup 62 Vodafone Group 
26 GlaxoSmithKline 63 Whitbread 
27 Helical Bar 64 WPP 
28 Homeserve 65 Aquarius Platinum 
29 Imagination Technologies Group 66 Cadbury 
30 IMI 67 Carphone Warehouse Group 
31 Imperial Tobacco Group 68 COLT Telecom Group SA 
32 International Power 69 Genus 
33 Invensys 70 Inmarsat 
34 Johnson Matthey PLC 71 Morgan Sindall 
35 Liberty International 72 Northumbrian Water Group 
36 Lloyds Banking Group 73 Robert Wiseman Dairies 
37 Lonmin   
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Appendix B: Decision Rule and Classification Scheme for Content analysis  
No. Description of Information for content analysis  
1. Company name. 
2. Year of report. 
3. Quality of community disclosure 
     a) Specific mention of any item of community activity as described below:  
   Community projects: 
• Donations of cash, products or employee services to support established 
community activities, events and organisations 
• Donation of premises or office equipment for community programmes 
• Developing and patronising local suppliers of goods and services 
• Provision of local employment and infrastructures 
• Provision of summer or part-time employment for students 
• Provision of livelihood and income generation schemes for local residence e.g. 
micro-credit. 
       Health and related activities: 
• Sponsoring public health projects 
• Aiding medical research 
• Provision of health facilities 
• Environmental sanitation. 
       Education and the arts: 
• Sponsoring educational conferences, seminars or art exhibits 
• Offering University scholarship for local residents 
• Provision of education facilities and skills training 
• Apprenticeship program to provide on the job training for local residents 
• Provision of opportunity for students placements. 
  Other community activities: 
• Other special community related activities, e.g. opening the company’s 
facilities to the public 
• Supporting and sponsoring sporting activities 
• Supporting national pride/government sponsored campaigns. 
       b) Factual information on community involvement disclosed; 
i) Financial information given  
ii) Physical information in form of pictures 
      c)    Important 
i) Located under chairman’s statements 
ii) Located in a separate section of annual reports 
     d)    Relevant  
- Located in the review of the year section 
- Located in directors report 
4. Corporate governance information: 
      a) NEDs (measured by proportion of total independent non-executive directors to total 
directors on the board 
     b) Board activities (measured by board meetings and size)  
     c) Audit committee activities (measured by audit committee meetings and size) 
     d) 
      
Other standing committees (CSR, Risk, and Disclosure committees were dichotomous 
variables where 1 = Presence and 0 = otherwise) 
 
Adapted from: (Deegan and Gordon, 1996; Gray, et al., 1995; Hackston and Milne, 1996; Ingram and Frazier, 1980) 
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Appendix C: Breusch and Pagan LM Test for Random Effects 
 
 
Appendix D: Box Plot of Variables Before and After Transformation 
  
 
 
Appendix E: Histogram of Residuals 
 
                          Prob > chi2 =     0.0000
                              chi2(1) =   338.08
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     1.281769       1.132153
                       e     2.360807       1.536492
                     TQS     5.436043       2.331532
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        TQS[Id,t] = Xb + u[Id] + e[Id,t]
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